Chris Jenkins, "Moving Target Defense for a Serial Communication Protocol"




CERIAS Weekly Security Seminar - Purdue University show

Summary: Nation-state adversaries have shown the ability to disrupt critical infrastructure through cyber-attacks targeting systems of networked, embedded computers. This knowledge raises concern that space systems could face similar threats. This project will research and develop moving target defense algorithms that will add cyber resilience to space systems by improving their ability to withstand cyber-attacks. Most proposed cyber resilience solutions focus on or require detection of threats before mitigative actions can be taken, a significant technical challenge. Our novel approach avoids this requirement while creating informational asymmetry that favors defenders over attackers. We hypothesize that moving target defenses (MTD) can create dynamic, uncertain environments on space systems and be used to defeat cyber threats against these systems. Many proposed solutions focus on or require detection (e.g. anomaly detection, AI, data analytics) before mitigative actions can be taken, a significant technical challenge. We propose a novel approach that avoids this requirement while creating informational asymmetry that favors defenders over attackers.